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Abstract
This work studies differential privacy in the context of the recently proposed shuffle
model. Unlike in the local model, where the server collecting privatized data from
users can track back an input to a specific user, in the shuffle model users submit their
privatized inputs to a server anonymously. This setup yields a trust model which sits
in between the classical curator and local models for differential privacy. The shuffle
model is the core idea in the Encode, Shuffle, Analyze (ESA) model introduced by
Bittau et al. (SOPS 2017). Recent work by Cheu et al. (EUROCRYPT 2019) analyzes
the differential privacy properties of the shuffle model and shows that in some cases
shuffled protocols provide strictly better accuracy than local protocols. Additionally,
Erlingsson et al. (SODA 2019) provide a privacy amplification bound quantifying the
level of curator differential privacy achieved by the shuffle model in terms of the local
differential privacy of the randomizer used by each user.
In this context, we make three contributions. First, we provide an optimal single
message protocol for summation of real numbers in the shuffle model. Our protocol
is very simple and has better accuracy and communication than the protocols for
this same problem proposed by Cheu et al. Optimality of this protocol follows from
our second contribution, a new lower bound for the accuracy of private protocols for
summation of real numbers in the shuffle model. The third contribution is a new
amplification bound for analyzing the privacy of protocols in the shuffle model in
terms of the privacy provided by the corresponding local randomizer. Our amplification
bound generalizes the results by Erlingsson et al. to a wider range of parameters, and
provides a whole family of methods to analyze privacy amplification in the shuffle
model.
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1 Introduction
Most of the research in differential privacy focuses on one of two extreme models of distri-
bution. In the curator model, a trusted data collector assembles users’ sensitive personal
information and analyses it while injecting random noise strategically designed to provide
both differential privacy and data utility. In the local model, each user i with input xi applies
a local randomizer R on her data to obtain a message yi, which is then submitted to an un-
trusted analyzer. Crucially, the randomizer R guarantees differential privacy independently
of the analyzer and the other users, even if they collude. Separation results between the local
and curator models are well-known since the early research in differential privacy: certain
learning tasks that can be performed in the curator model cannot be performed in the local
model [22] and, furthermore, for those tasks that can be performed in the local model there
are provable large gaps in accuracy when compared with the curator model. An important
example is the summation of binary or (bounded) real-valued inputs among n users, which
can be performed with O(1) noise in the curator model [13] whereas in the local model the
noise level is Ω(
√
n) [6, 10]. Nevertheless, the local model has been the model of choice
for recent implementations of differentially private protocols by Google [15], Apple [24], and
Microsoft [12]. Not surprisingly, these implementations require a huge user base to overcome
the high error level.
The high level of noise required in the local model has motivated a recent search for
alternative models. For example, the Encode, Shuffle, Analyze (ESA) model introduces a
trusted shuffler that receives user messages and permutes them before they are handled to
an untrusted analyzer [8]. A recent work by Cheu et al. [11] provides a formal analytical
model for studying the shuffle model and protocols for summation of binary and real-valued
inputs, essentially recovering the accuracy of the trusted curator model. The protocol for
real-valued inputs requires users to send multiple messages, with a total of O(
√
n) single bit
messages sent by each user. Also of relevance is the work of Ishai et al. [17] showing how
to combine secret sharing with secure shuffling to implement distributed summation, as it
allows to simulate the Laplace mechanism of the curator model. Instead we focus on the
single-message shuffle model.
Another recent work by Erlingsson et al. [14] shows that the shuffling primitive provides
privacy amplification, as introducing random shuffling in local model protocols reduces ε to
ε/
√
n.
A word of caution is in place with respect to the shuffle model, as it differs significantly
from the local model in terms of the assumed trust. In particular, the privacy guarantee
provided by protocols in the shuffle model degrades with the fraction of users who deviate
from the protocol. This is because, besides relying on a trusted shuffling step, the shuffle
model requires users to provide messages carefully crafted to protect each other’s privacy.
This is in contrast with the curator model, where this responsibility is entirely held by the
trusted curator. Nevertheless, we believe that this model is of interest both for theoretical
and practical reasons. On the one hand it allows to explore the space in between the local
and curator model, and on the other hand it leads to mechanisms that are easy to explain,
verify, and implement; with limited accuracy loss with respect to the curator model.
In this work we do not assume any particular implementation of the shuffling step. Nat-
urally, alternative implementations will lead to different computational trade-offs and trust
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assumptions. The shuffle model allows to disentangle these aspects from the precise compu-
tation at hand, as the result of shuffling the randomized inputs submitted by each user is
required to be differentially private, and therefore any subsequent analysis performed by the
analyzer will be private due to the postprocessing property of differential privacy.
1.1 Overview of Our Results
In this work we focus on single-message shuffle model protocols. In such protocols (i) each
user i applies a local randomizer R on her input xi to obtain a single message yi; (ii) the
messages (y1, . . . , yn) are shuffled to obtain (yσ(1), . . . , yσ(n)) where σ is a randomly selected
permutation; and (iii) an analyzer post-processes (yσ(1), . . . , yσ(n)) to produce an outcome.
It is required that the mechanism resulting from the combination of the local randomizer R
and the random shuffle should provide differential privacy.
1.1.1 A protocol for private summation.
Our first contribution is a single-message shuffle model protocol for private summation of
(real) numbers xi ∈ [0, 1]. The resulting estimator is unbiased and has standard deviation
Oε,δ(n
1/6).
To reduce the domain size, our protocol uses a fixed-point representation, where users
apply randomized rounding to snap their input xi to a multiple x¯i of 1/k (where k =
Oε,δ(n
1/3)). We then apply on x¯i a local randomizer RPH for computing private histograms
over a finite domain of size k + 1. The randomizer RPH is simply a randomized response
mechanism: with (small) probability γ it ignores x¯i and outputs a uniformly random domain
element, otherwise it reports its input x¯i truthfully. There are hence about γn instances of
RPH whose report is independent to their input, and whose role is to create what we call
a privacy blanket, which masks the outputs which are reported truthfully. Combining RPH
with a random shuffle, we get the equivalent of a histogram of the sent messages, which, in
turn, is the pointwise sum of the histogram of approximately (1−γ)n values x¯i sent truthfully
and the privacy blanket, which is a histogram of approximately γn random values.
To see the benefit of creating a privacy blanket, consider the recent shuffle model summa-
tion protocol by Cheu et al. [11]. This protocol also applies randomized rounding. However,
for privacy reasons, the rounded value needs to be represented in unary across multiple 1-bit
messages, which are then fed into a summation protocol for binary values. The resulting
error of this protocol is O(1) (as is achieved in the curator model). However, the use of unary
representation requires each user to send Oε(
√
n) 1-bit messages (whereas in our protocol
every user sends a single O(log n)-bit message). We note that Cheu et al. also present a
single message protocol for real summation with O(
√
n) error.
1.1.2 A lower bound for private summation.
We also provide a matching lower bound showing that any single-message shuffled protocol for
summation must exhibit mean squared error of order Ω(n1/3). In our lower bound argument
we consider i.i.d. input distributions, for which we show that without loss of generality the
local randomizer’s image is the interval [0, 1], and the analyzer is a simple summation of
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messages. With this view, we can contrast the privacy and accuracy of the protocol. On
the one hand, the randomizer may need to output y ∈ [0, 1] on input x ∈ [0, 1] such that
|x− y| is small, to promote accuracy. However, this interferes with privacy as it may enable
distinguishing between the input x and a potential input x′ for which |x′ − y| is large.
Together with our upper bound, this result shows that the single-message shuffle model
sits strictly between the curator and the local models of differential privacy. This had been
shown by Cheu et al. [11] in a less direct way by showing that (i) the private selection
problem can be solved more accurately in the curator model than the shuffle model, and (ii)
the private summation problem can be solved more accurately in the shuffle model than in
the local model. For (i) they rely on a generic translation from the shuffle to the local model
and known lower bounds for private selection in the local model, while our lower bound
operates directly in the shuffle model. For (ii) they propose a single-message protocol that
is less accurate than ours.
1.1.3 Privacy amplification by shuffling.
Lastly, we prove a new privacy amplification result for shuffled mechanisms. We show that
shuffling n copies of an ε0-LDP local randomizer with ε0 = O(log(n/ log(1/δ))) yields an
(ε, δ)-DP mechanism with ε = O((ε0∧1)eε0
√
log(1/δ)/n), where a∧b = min{a, b}. The proof
formalizes the notion of a privacy blanket that we use informally in the privacy analysis of our
summation protocol. In particular, we show that the output distribution of local randomizers
(for any local differentially private protocol) can be decomposed as a convex combination of
an input-independent blanket distribution and an input-dependent distribution.
Privacy amplification plays a major role in the design of differentially private mechanisms.
These include amplification by subsampling [22] and by iteration [16], and the recent seminal
work on amplification via shuffling by Erlingsson et al. [14]. In particular, Erlingsson et
al. considered a setting more general than ours which allows for interactive protocols in
the shuffle model by first generating a random permutation of the users’ inputs and then
sequentially applying a (possibly different) local randomizer to each element in the permuted
vector. Moreover, each local randomizer is chosen depending on the output of previous local
randomizers. To distinguish this setting from ours, we shall call the setting of Erlingsson et
al. shuffle-then-randomize and ours randomize-then-shuffle. We also note that both settings
are equivalent when there is a single local randomizer that will be applied to all the inputs.
Throughout this paper, unless we explicitly say otherwise, the term shuffle model refers to
the randomize-then-shuffle setting.
In the shuffle-then-randomize setting, Erlingsson et al. provide an amplification bound
with ε = O(ε0
√
log(1/δ)/n) for ε0 = O(1). Our result in the randomize-then-shuffle setting
recovers this bound for the case of one randomizer, and extends it to ε0 which is logarithmic
in n. For example, using the new bound, it is possible to shuffle a local randomizer with
ε0 = O(log(ε
2n/ log(1/δ))) to obtain a (ε, δ)-DP mechanism with ε = Θ(1) . Cheu et al. [11]
also proved that a level of LDP ε0 = O(log(ε
2n/ log(1/δ))) suffices to achieve (ε, δ)-DP
mechanisms through shuffling, though only for binary randomized response in the randomize-
then-shuffle setting. Our amplification bound captures the regimes from both [14] and [11],
thus providing a unified analysis of privacy amplification by shuffling for arbitrary local
randomizers in the randomize-then-shuffle setting. Our proofs are also conceptually simpler
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Figure 1: The local (left) and shuffle (right) models of Differential Privacy. Dotted lines
indicate differentially private values with respect to the dataset ~x = (x1, . . . , xn), where user
i holds xi.
than those in [14, 11] since we do not rely on privacy amplification by subsampling to obtain
our results.
2 Preliminaries
Our notation is standard. We denote domains as X, Y, Z and randomized mechanism as
M, P , R, S. For denoting sets and multisets we will use uppercase letters A, B, etc., and
denote their elements as a, b, etc., while we will denote tuples as ~x, ~y, etc. Random variables,
tuples and sets are denoted by X, ~X and X respectively. We also use greek letters µ, ν, ω for
distributions. Finally, we write [k] = {1, . . . , k}, a ∧ b = min{a, b}, [u]+ = max{u, 0} and N
for the natural numbers.
2.1 The Curator and Local Models of Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a formal approach to privacy-preserving data disclosure that prevents
attemps to learn private information about specific to individuals in a data release [13].
The definition of differential privacy requires that the contribution xi of an individual to a
dataset ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) has not much effect on what the adversary sees. This is formalized
by considering a dataset ~x′ that differs from ~x only in one element, denoted ~x ' ~x′, and
requiring that the views of a potential adversary when running a mechanism on inputs ~x and
~x′ are “indistinguishable”. Let ε ≥ 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1]. We say that a randomized mechanism
M : Xn → Y is (ε, δ)-DP if
∀~x ' ~x′,∀E ⊆ Y : P[M(~x) ∈ E] ≤ eεP[M(~x′) ∈ E] + δ .
As mentioned above, different models of differential privacy arise depending on whether
one can assume the availability of a trusted party (a curator) that has access to the in-
formation from all users in a centralized location. This setup is the one considered in the
definition above. The other extreme scenario is when each user privatizes their data locally
and submits the private values to a (potentially untrusted) server for aggregation. This is
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the domain of local differential privacy1 (see Figure 1, left), where a user owns a data record
x ∈ X and uses a local randomizer R : X→ Y to submit the privatized value R(x). In this
case we say that the local randomizer is (ε, δ)-LDP if
∀x, x′,∀E ⊆ Y : P[R(x) ∈ E] ≤ eεP[R(x′) ∈ E] + δ .
The key difference is that in this case we must protect each user’s data, and therefore the
definition considers changing a user’s value x to another arbitrary value x′.
Moving from curator DP to local DP can be seen as effectively redefining the view that
an adversary has on the data during the execution of a mechanism. In particular, if R is an
(ε, δ)-LDP local randomizer, then the mechanism M : Xn → Yn given by M(x1, . . . , xn) =
(R(x1), . . . ,R(xn)) is (ε, δ)-DP in the curator sense. The single-message shuffle model sits
in between these two settings.
2.2 The Single-Message Shuffle Model
The single-message shuffle model of differential privacy considers a data collector that re-
ceives one message yi from each of the n users as in the local model of differential privacy.
The crucial difference with the local model is that the shuffle model assumes that a mech-
anism is in place to provide anonymity to each of the messages, i.e. the data collector is
unable to associate messages to users. This is equivalent to assuming that, in the view of
the adversary, these messages have been shuffled by a random permutation unknown to the
adversary (see Figure 1, right).
Following the notation in [11], we define a single-message protocol P in the shuffle model
to be a pair of algorithms P = (R,A), where R : X → Y, and A : Yn → Z. We call R
the local randomizer, Y the message space of the protocol, A the analyzer of P , and Z the
output space. The overall protocol implements a mechanism P : Xn → Z as follows. Each
user i holds a data record xi, to which she applies the local randomizer to obtain a message
yi = R(xi). The messages yi are then shuffled and submitted to the analyzer. We write
S(y1, . . . , yn) to denote the random shuffling step, where S : Yn → Yn is a shuffler that
applies a random permutation to its inputs. In summary, the output of P(x1, . . . , xn) is
given by A ◦ S ◦ Rn(~x) = A(S(R(x1), . . . ,R(xn))).
From a privacy point of view, our threat model assumes that the analyzer A is applied to
the shuffled messages by an untrusted data collector. Therefore, when analyzing the privacy
of a protocol in the shuffle model we are interested in the indistinguishability between the
shuffles S ◦ Rn(~x) and S ◦ Rn(~x′) for datasets ~x ' ~x′. In this sense, the analyzer’s role is
to provide utility for the output of the protocol P , whose privacy guarantees follow from
those of the shuffled mechanism M = S ◦Rn : Xn → Yn by the post-processing property of
differential privacy. That is, the protocol P is (ε, δ)-DP whenever the shuffled mechanism
M is (ε, δ)-DP.
When analyzing the privacy of a shuffled mechanism we assume the shuffler S is a per-
fectly secure primitive. This implies that a data collector observing the shuffled messages
S(y1, . . . , yn) obtains no information about which user generated each of the messages. An
equivalent way to state this fact, which will sometimes be useful in our analysis of shuffled
1Of which, in this paper, we only consider the non-interactive version for simplicity.
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mechanisms, is to say that the output of the shuffler is a multiset instead of a tuple. For-
mally, this means that we can also think of the shuffler as a deterministic map S : Yn → NYn
which takes a tuple ~y = (y1, . . . , yn) with n elements from Y and returns the multiset
Y = {y1, . . . , yn} of its coordinates, where NYn denotes the collection of all multisets over
Y with cardinality n. Sometimes we will refer to such multisets Y ∈ NYn as histograms to
emphasize the fact that they can be regarded functions Y : Y→ N counting the number of
occurrences of each element of Y in Y .
2.3 Mean Square Error
When analyzing the utility of shuffled protocols for real summation we will use the mean
square error (MSE) as accuracy measure. The mean squared error of a randomized protocol
P(~x) for approximating a deterministic quantity f(~x) is given by MSE(P , ~x) = E[(P(~x) −
f(~x))2], where the expectation is taken over the randomness of P . Note that when the
protocol is unbiased the MSE is equivalent to the variance, since in this case we have
E[P(~x)] = f(~x) and therefore
MSE(P , ~x) = E[(P(~x)− E[P(~x)])2] = V[P(~x)] .
In addition to the MSE for a fixed input, we also consider the worst-case MSE over all
possible inputs MSE(P), and the expected MSE on a distribution over inputs MSE(P , ~X).
These quantities are defined as follows:
MSE(P) = sup
~x
MSE(P , ~x) ,
MSE(P , ~X) = E~x∼~X[MSE(P , ~x)] .
3 The Privacy of Shuffled Randomized Response
In this section we show a protocol for n parties to compute a private histogram over the
domain [k] in the single-message shuffle model. The local randomizer of our protocol is shown
in Algorithm 1, and the analyzer simply builds a histogram of the received messages. The
randomizer is parameterized by a probability γ, and consists of a k-ary randomized response
mechanism that returns the true value x with probability 1 − γ, and a uniformly random
value with probability γ. This randomizer has been studied and used (in the local model)
in several previous works [21, 20, 7]. We discuss how to set γ to satisfy differential privacy
next.
3.1 The Blanket Intuition
In each execution of Algorithm 1 a subsetB of approximately γn parties will submit a random
value, while the remaining parties will submit their true value. The values sent by parties
in B form a histogram Y1 of uniformly random values and the values sent by the parties not
in B correspond to the true histogram Y2 of their data. An important observation is that
in the shuffle model the information obtained by the server is equivalent to the histogram
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Algorithm 1: Private Histogram: Local Randomizer RPHγ,k,n
Public Parameters: γ ∈ [0, 1], domain size k, and number of parties n
Input: x ∈ [k]
Output: y ∈ [k]
Sample b← Ber(γ)
if b = 0 then
Let y ← x
else
Sample y ← Unif([k])
return y
Y1 ∪ Y2. This observation is a simple generalization of the observation made by Cheu et
al. [11] that shuffling of binary data corresponds to secure addition. When k > 2, shuffling
of categorical data corresponds to a secure histogram computation, and in particular secure
addition of histograms. In summary, the information collected by the server in an execution
corresponds to a histogram Y with approximately γn random entries and (1− γ)n truthful
entries, which as mentioned above we decompose as Y = Y1 ∪ Y2.
To achieve differential privacy we need to set the value γ of Algorithm 1 so that Y changes
by an appropriately bounded amount when computed on neighboring datasets where only
a certain party’s data (say party n) changes. Our privacy argument does not rely on the
anonymity of the set B and thus we can assume, for the privacy analysis, that the server
knows B. We further assume in the analysis that the server knows the inputs from all parties
except the nth one, which gives her the ability to remove from Y the values submitted by
any party who responded truthfully among the first n− 1.
Now consider two datasets of size n that differ on the input from the nth party. In an
execution where party n is in B we trivially get privacy since the value submitted by this
party is independent of its input. Otherwise, party n will be submitting their true value
xn, in which case the server can determine Y2 up to the value xn using that she knows
(x1, . . . , xn−1). Hence, a server trying to break the privacy of party n observes Y1 ∪ {xn},
the union of a random histogram with the input of this party. Intuitively, the privacy of the
protocol boils down to setting γ so that Y1, which we call the random blanket of the local
randomizer RPHγ,k,n, appropriately “hides” xn.
As we will see in Section 5, the intuitive notion of the blanket of a local randomizer can
be formally defined for arbitrary local randomizers using a generalization of the notion of
total variation distance from pairs to sets of distributions. This will allow us to represent the
output distribution of any local randomizer R(x) as a mixture of the form (1 − γ)νx + γω,
for some 0 < γ < 1 and probability distributions νx and ω, of which we call ω the privacy
blanket of the local randomizer R.
3.2 Privacy Analysis of Algorithm 1
Let us now formalize the above intuition, and prove privacy for our protocol for an appropri-
ate choice of γ. In particular, we prove the following theorem, where the assumption ε ≤ 1
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is only for technical convenience. A more general approach to obtain privacy guarantees for
shuffled mechanisms is provided in Section 5.
Theorem 3.1. The shuffled mechanism M = S ◦RPHγ,k,n is (ε, δ)-DP for any k, n ∈ N, ε ≤ 1
and δ ∈ (0, 1] such that γ = max{14k log(2/δ)
(n−1)ε2 ,
27k
(n−1)ε} < 1.
Proof. Let D,D′ ∈ [k]n be neighboring databases of the form D = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) and
D′ = (x1, x2, . . . , x′n). We assume that the server knows the set B of users who submit
random values, which is equivalent to revealing to the server a vector ~b = (b1, . . . , bn) of the
bits b sampled in the execution of each of the local randomizers. We also assume the server
knows the inputs from the first n− 1 parties.
Hence, we define the view ViewM of the server on a realization of the protocol as the
tuple ViewM(~x) = (Y, ~x∩,~b) containing:
1. A multiset Y =M(~x) = {y1, . . . , yn} with the outputs yi of each local randomizer.
2. A tuple ~x∩ = (x1, . . . , xn−1) with the inputs from the first n− 1 users.
3. The tuple ~b = (b1, . . . , bn) of binary values indicating which users submitted their true
values.
Proving that the protocol is (ε, δ)-DP when the server has access to all this information will
imply the same level of privacy for the shuffled mechanism S ◦RPHγ,k,n by the post-processing
property of differential privacy.
To show that ViewM satisfies (ε, δ)-DP it is enough to prove
PV∼ViewM(~x)
[
P[ViewM(~x) = V]
P[ViewM(~x′) = V]
≥ eε
]
≤ δ .
We start by fixing a value V in the range of ViewM and computing the probability ratio
above conditioned on V = V .
Consider first the case where V is such that bn = 1, i.e. party n submits a random value
independent of her input. In this case privacy holds trivially since P[ViewM(~x) = V ] =
P[ViewM(~x′) = V ]. Hence, we focus on the case where party n submits her true value
(bn = 0). For j ∈ [k], let nj be the number of messages received by the server with value j
after removing from Y any truthful answers submitted by the first n − 1 users. With our
notation above, we have nj = Y1(j) + I[xn = j] and
∑k
j=1 nj = |B| + 1 for the execution
with input ~x. Now assume, without loss of generality, that xn = 1 and x
′
n = 2. As xn = 1,
we have that
P[ViewM(~x) = V ] =
( |B|
n1 − 1, n2, ..., nk
)
γ|B|(1− γ)n−|B|
k|B|
,
corresponding to the probability of a particular pattern ~b of users sampling from the blanket
times the probability of obtaining a particular histogram Y1 when sampling |B| elements
uniformly at random from [k]. Similarly, using that x′n = 2 we have
P[ViewM(~x′) = V ] =
( |B|
n1, n2 − 1, ..., nk
)
γ|B|(1− γ)n−|B|
k|B|
.
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Therefore, taking the ratio between the last two probabilities we find that, in the case bn = 0,
P[ViewM(~x) = V ]
P[ViewM(~x′) = V ]
=
n1
n2
.
Now note that for V ∼ ViewM(~x) the count n2 = n2(V) follows a binomial distribution
N2 with n − 1 trials and success probability γ/k, and n1(V) − 1 = N1 − 1 follows the same
distribution. Thus, we have
PV∼ViewM(~x)
[
P[ViewM(~x) = V]
P[ViewM(~x′) = V]
≥ eε
]
= P
[
N1
N2
≥ eε
]
,
where N1 ∼ Bin
(
n− 1, γ
k
)
+ 1 and N2 ∼ Bin
(
n− 1, γ
k
)
.
We now bound the probability above using a union bound and the multiplicative Chernoff
bound. Let c = E[N2] = γ(n−1)k . Since N1/N2 ≥ eε implies that either N1 ≥ ceε/2 or
N2 ≤ ce−ε/2, we have
P
[
N1
N2
≥ eε
]
≤ P [N1 ≥ ceε/2]+ P [N2 ≤ ce−ε/2]
= P
[
N2 ≥ ceε/2 − 1
]
+ P
[
N2 ≤ ce−ε/2
]
= P
[
N2 − E[N1] ≥ c
(
eε/2 − 1− 1
c
)]
+ P
[
N2 − E[N2] ≤ c(e−ε/2 − 1)
]
.
Applying the multiplicative Chernoff bound to each of these probabilities then gives that
P
[
N1
N2
≥ eε
]
≤ exp
(
− c
3
(
eε/2 − 1− 1
c
)2)
+ exp
(
− c
2
(1− e−ε/2)2
)
.
Assuming ε ≤ 1, both of the right hand summands are less than or equal to δ
2
if
c =
γ(n− 1)
k
≥ max
{
14 log
(
2
δ
)
ε2
,
27
ε
}
.
Indeed, for the second term this follows from 1− e−ε/2 ≥ (1− e−1/2)ε ≥ ε/√7 for ε ≤ 1. For
the first term we use that c ≥ 27
ε
implies eε/2 − 1− 1
c
≥ 25
54
ε and 14 ≥ 3·542
252
.
Two remarks about this result are in order. First, we should emphasize that the assump-
tion of ε ≤ 1 is only required for simplicity when using Chernoff’s inequality to bound the
probability that the privacy loss random variable is large. Without any restriction on ε, a
similar result can be achieved by replacing Chernoff’s inequality with Bennett’s inequality
[9, Theorem 2.9] to account for the variance of the privacy loss random variable in the tail
bound. Here we decide not to pursue this route because the ad-hoc privacy analysis of Theo-
rem 3.1 is superseded by the results in Section 5 anyway. The second observation about this
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Algorithm 2: Local Randomizer Rc,k,n
Public Parameters: c, k, and number of parties n
Input: x ∈ [0, 1]
Output: y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}
Let x¯← bxkc+ Ber(xk − bxkc) . x¯ is the encoding of x with precision k
Sample b← Ber
(
c(k+1)
n
)
if b = 0 then
Let y ← x¯
else
Sample y ← Unif({0, 1, . . . , k})
return y
Algorithm 3: Analyzer Ac,k,n
Public Parameters: c, k, and number of parties n
Input: Multiset {yi}i∈[n], with yi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}
Output: z ∈ [0, 1]
Let zˆ ← 1
k
∑n
i=1 yi
Let z ← DeBias(zˆ), where DeBias(w) =
(
w − c(k+1)
2
)
/
(
1− c(k+1)
n
)
return z
result is that, with the choice of γ made above, the local randomizer RPHγ,k,n satisfies ε0-LDP
with
ε0 = O
(
log
(
nε2
log(1/δ)
− k
))
= O
(
log
(
nε2
log(1/δ)
(
1− γ
14
)))
.
This is obtained according to the formula provided by Lemma 5.1 in Section 5.1. Thus, we
see that Theorem 3.1 can be regarded as a privacy amplification statement showing that
shuffling n copies of an ε0-LDP local randomized with ε0 = Oδ(log(nε
2)) yields a mechanism
satisfying (ε, δ)-DP. In Section 5.1 we will show that this is not coincidence, but rather an
instance of a general privacy amplification result.
4 Optimal Summation in the Shuffle Model
4.1 Upper Bound
In this section we present a protocol for the problem of computing the sum of real values
xi ∈ [0, 1] in the single-message shuffle model. Our protocol is parameterized by values c, k,
and the number of parties n, and its local randomizer and analyzer are shown in Algorithms 2
and 3, respectively.
The protocol uses the protocol depicted in Algorithm 1 in a black-box manner. To
compute a differentially private approximation of
∑
i xi, we fix a value k. Then we operate
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on the fixed-point encoding of each input xi, which is an integer x¯i ∈ {0, . . . , k}. That is, we
replace xi with its fixed-point approximation x¯i/k. The protocol then applies the randomized
response mechanism in Algorithm 1 to each x¯i to submit a value yi to compute a differentially
private histogram of the (y1, . . . , yn) as in the previous section. From these values the server
can approximate
∑
i xi by post processing, which includes a debiasing standard step. The
privacy of the protocol described in Algorithms 2 and 3 follows directly from the privacy
analysis of Algorithm 1 given in Section 3.
Regarding accuracy, a crucial point in this reduction is that the encoding x¯i of xi is via
randomized rounding and hence unbiased. In more detail, as shown in Algorithm 2, the value
x is encoded as x¯ = bxkc + Ber(xk − bxkc). This ensures that E[x¯/k] = E[x] and that the
mean squared error due to rounding (which equals the variance) is at most 1
4k2
. The local
randomizer either sends this fixed-point encoding or a random value in {0, 1, . . . , k} with
probabilities 1− γ and γ, respectively, where (following the analysis in the previous section)
we set γ = k+1
n
c. Note that the mean squared error when the local randomizer submits a
random value is at most 1
2
. This observations lead to the following accuracy bound.
Theorem 4.1. For any ε ≤ 1, δ ∈ (0, 1] and n ∈ N, there exist parameters c, k such that
Pc,k,n is (ε, δ)-DP and
MSE(Pc,k,n) = O
(
n1/3 · log
2/3(1/δ)
ε4/3
)
.
Proof. The following bound on MSE(Pc,k,n) follows from the observations above: unbiased-
ness of the estimator computed by the analyzer and randomized rounding, and the bounds
on the variance of our randomized response.
MSE(Pc,k,n) = sup
~x
E[(DeBias(zˆ)−
∑
i
xi)
2]
= sup
~x
E
(∑
i
(DeBias(yi/k)− xi)
)2
= sup
~x
∑
i
E
[
(DeBias(yi/k)− xi)2
]
= sup
~x
∑
i
V [DeBias(yi/k)]
=
n
(1− γ)2 supx1
V[y1/k]
≤ n
(1− γ)2
(
1− γ
4k2
+
γ
2
)
≤ n
(1− γ)2
(
1
4k2
+
c(k + 1)
2n
)
.
Choosing the parameter k = (n/c)1/3 minimizes the sum in the above expression and provides
a bound on the MSE of the form O(c2/3n1/3). Plugging in c = γ n
k+1
= O
(
log(1/δ)
ε2
)
from our
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analysis in the previous section (Theorem 3.1) yields the bound in the statement of the
theorem.
Note that as our protocol corresponds to an unbiased estimator, the MSE is equal to the
variance in this case. Using this observation we immediately obtain the following corollary
for estimation of statistical queries in the single-message shuffle model.
Corollary 4.1.1. For every statistical query q : X 7→ [0, 1], ε ≤ 1, δ ∈ (0, 1] and n ∈ N,
there is an (ε, δ)-DP n-party unbiased protocol for estimating 1
n
∑
i q(xi) in the single-message
shuffle model with standard deviation O
(
log1/3(1/δ)
n5/6ε2/3
)
.
4.2 Lower Bound
In this section we show that any differentially private protocol P for the problem of estimating∑
i xi in the single-message shuffle model must have MSE(P) = Ω(n1/3) This shows that our
protocol from the previous section is optimal, and gives a separation result for the single-
message shuffle model, showing that its accuracy lies between the curator and local models
of differential privacy.
4.2.1 Reduction in the i.i.d. setting.
We first show that when the inputs to the protocol P are sampled i.i.d. one can assume,
for the purpose of showing a lower bound, that the protocol P for estimating ∑i xi is of a
simplified form. Namely, we show that the local randomizer can be taken to have output
values in [0, 1], and its analyzer simply adds up all received messages.
Lemma 4.1. Let P = (R,A) be an n-party protocol for real summation in the single-message
shuffle model. Let X be a random variable on [0, 1] and suppose that users sample their inputs
from the distribution ~X = (X1, . . . ,Xn), where each Xi is an independent copy of X. Then,
there exists a protocol P ′ = (R′,A′) such that:
1. A′(y1, . . . , yn) =
∑n
i=1 yi and
2 Im(R′) ⊆ [0, 1].
2. MSE(P ′, ~X) ≤MSE(P , ~X).
3. If the shuffled mechanism S ◦ Rn is (ε, δ)-DP, then S ◦ R′n is also (ε, δ)-DP.
Proof. Consider the post-processed local randomizer R′ = f ◦ R where f(y) = E[X|R(X) =
y]. In Bayesian estimation, f is called the posterior mean estimator, and is known to be a
minimum MSE estimator [18]. Since Im(R′) ⊆ [0, 1], we have a protocol P ′ satisfying claim
1.
Next we show that MSE(P ′, ~X) ≤ MSE(P , ~X). Note that the analyzer A in protocol P
can be seen as an estimator of Z =
∑
i Xi given observations from
~Y = (Y1, . . . ,Yn), where
2Here we use Im(R′) to denote the image of the local randomizer R′.
13
Yi = R(Xi). Now consider an arbitrary estimator h of Z given the observation ~Y = ~y. We
have
MSE(h, ~y) = E[(h(~y)− Z)2|~Y = ~y]
= E[Z2|~Y = ~y]− 2h(~y)E[Z|~Y = ~y] + h(~y)2 .
It follows from minimizing MSE(h, ~y) with respect to h that the minimum MSE estimator
of Z given ~Y is h(~y) = E[Z|~Y = ~y]. Hence, by linearity of expectation, and the fact that the
Yi are independent,
E[Z|~Y = ~y] =
n∑
i=1
E[Xi|~Y = ~y] =
n∑
i=1
E[Xi|Yi = yi] =
n∑
i=1
f(yi) .
Therefore, we have shown that P ′ = (R′,A′) implements a minimum MSE estimator for Z
given (R(X1), . . . ,R(Xn)), and in particular MSE(P ′, ~X) ≤ MSE(P , ~X).
Part 3 of the lemma follows from the standard post-processing property of differential
privacy by observing that the output of S ◦ R′n(~x) can be obtained by applying f to each
element in the output of S ◦ Rn(~x).
4.2.2 Proof of the lower bound.
It remains to show that, for any protocol P = (R,A) satisfying the conditions of Lemma 4.1,
we can find a tuple of i.i.d. random variables ~X such that MSE(P , ~X) = Ω(n1/3). Recall that
by virtue of Lemma 4.1 we can assume, without loss of generality, that R is a mapping from
[0, 1] into itself, A sums its inputs, and ~X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) where the Xi are i.i.d. copies of some
random variable X. We first show that under these assumptions we can reduce the search
for a lower bound on MSE(P , ~X) to consider only the expected square error of an individual
run of the local randomizer.
Lemma 4.2. Let P = (R,A) be an n-party protocol for real summation in the single-message
shuffle model such that R : [0, 1] → [0, 1] and A is summation. Suppose ~X = (X1, . . . ,Xn),
where the Xi are i.i.d. copies of some random variable X. Then,
MSE(P , ~X) ≥ nE[(R(X)− X)2] .
Proof. The result follows from an elementary calculation:
MSE(P , ~X) = E
∑
i∈[n]
R(Xi)− Xi
2
=
∑
i
E[(R(Xi)− Xi)2] +
∑
i 6=j
E[(R(Xi)− Xi)(R(Xj)− Xj)]
=
∑
i
E[(R(Xi)− Xi)2] +
∑
i 6=j
E[R(Xi)− Xi]2
≥ nE[(R(X)− X)2] .
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Therefore, to obtain our lower bound it will suffice to find a distribution on [0, 1] such that
if R : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is a local randomizer for which the protocol P = (R,A) is differentially
private, then R has expected square error Ω(n−2/3) under that distribution. We start by
constructing such distribution and then show that it satisfies the desired properties.
Consider the partition of the unit interval [0, 1] into k disjoint subintervals of size 1/k,
where k ∈ N is a parameter to be determined later. We will take inputs from the set
I = {m/k − 1/2k | m ∈ [k]} of midpoints of these intervals. For any a ∈ I we denote by
I(x) the subinterval of [0, 1] containing a. Given a local randomizer R : [0, 1] → [0, 1] we
define the probability pa,b = P[R(a) ∈ I(b)] that the local randomizer maps an input a to
the subinterval centered at b for any a, b ∈ I.
Now let X ∼ Unif(I) be a random variable sampled uniformly from I. The following
observations are central to the proof of our lower bound. First observe that R maps X to
a value outside of its interval with probability 1
k
∑
b∈I(1 − pb,b). If this event occurs, then
R(X) incurs a squared error of at least 1/(2k)2, as the absolute error will be at least half the
width of an interval. Similarly, when R maps an input a to a point inside an interval I(b)
with a 6= b, the squared error incurred is at least (|b− a|− 1/2k)2, as the error is at least the
distance between the two interval midpoints minus half the width of an interval. The next
lemma encapsulates a useful calculation related to this observation.
Lemma 4.3. For any b ∈ I = {m/k − 1/2k | m ∈ [k]} we have
1
k
∑
a∈I\{b}
(
|a− b| − 1
2k
)2
≥ 1
48
(
1− 1
k2
)
.
Proof. Let b = m/k − 1/2k for some m ∈ [k]. Then,
1
k
∑
a∈I\{b}
(
|a− b| − 1
2k
)2
=
1
k3
∑
i∈[k]\{m}
(
|i−m| − 1
2
)2
≥ 1
4k3
∑
i∈[k]\{m}
(i−m)2 = 1
4k3
∑
i∈[k]
(i−m)2 ,
where we used (u− 1/2)2 ≥ u2/4 for u ≥ 1. Now let U ∼ Unif([k]) and observe that for any
m ∈ [k] we have ∑
i∈[k]
(i−m)2 ≥
∑
i∈[k]
(i− E[U])2 = kV[U] = k
3 − k
12
.
Now we can combine the two observations about the error of R under X into a lower
bound for its expected square error. Subsequently we will show how the output probabilities
occurring in this bound are related under differential privacy.
Lemma 4.4. Let R : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be a local randomizer and X ∼ Unif(I) with I =
{m/k − 1/2k | m ∈ [k]}. Then,
E[(R(X)− X)2] ≥
∑
b∈I
min
{
1− pb,b
4k3
,
1
48
(
1− 1
k2
)
min
a∈I
pa,b
}
.
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Proof. The bound in obtained by formalizing the two observations made above to obtain
two different lower bounds for E[(R(X) − X)2] and then taking their minimum. Our first
bound follows directly from the discussion above:
E[(R(X)− X)2] =
∑
b∈I
E[(R(b)− b)2]P[X = b] = 1
k
∑
b∈I
E[(R(b)− b)2]
≥ 1
k
∑
b∈I
(1− pb,b) · 1
(2k)2
=
∑
b∈I
1− pb,b
4k3
.
Our second bound follows from the fact that the squared error is at least (|b − a| − 1
2k
)2 if
X = a and R(a) ∈ I(b), for a, b ∈ I such that a 6= b:
E[(R(X)− X)2] = 1
k
∑
b∈I
E[(R(b)− b)2]
≥ 1
k
∑
b∈I
∑
a∈I\{b}
pa,b
(
|b− a| − 1
2k
)2
≥ 1
k
∑
b∈I
(min
a∈I
pa,b)
∑
a∈I\{b}
(
|b− a| − 1
2k
)2
≥
∑
b∈I
(min
a∈I
pa,b)
1
48
(
1− 1
k2
)
,
where the last inequality uses Lemma 4.3. Finally, we get
E[(R(X)− X)2] ≥ min
{∑
b∈I
1− pb,b
4k3
,
∑
b∈I
(min
a∈I
pa,b)
1
48
(
1− 1
k2
)}
≥
∑
b∈I
min
{
1− pb,b
4k3
,
1
48
(
1− 1
k2
)
min
a∈I
pa,b
}
.
Lemma 4.5. Let R : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be a local randomizer such that the shuffled protocol
M = S ◦Rn is (ε, δ)-DP with δ < 1/2. Then, for any a, b ∈ I, a 6= b, either pb,b < 1− e−ε/2
or pa,b ≥ (1/2− δ)/n.
Proof. If pb,b < 1 − e−ε/2 then the proof is done. Otherwise, consider the neighboring
datasets ~x = (a, . . . , a) and ~x′ = (b, a, . . . , a). Recall that the output ofM(~x) is the multiset
obtained from the coordinates of (R(x1), . . . ,R(xn)). By considering the event that this
multiset contains no elements from I(b), the definition of differential privacy gives
P[M(~x) ∩ I(b) = ∅] ≤ eεP[M(~x′) ∩ I(b) = ∅] + δ . (1)
As P[M(~x)∩I(b) = ∅] = (1−pa,b)n and P[M(~x′)∩I(b) = ∅] = (1−pb,b)(1−pa,b)n−1 ≤ (1−pb,b),
we get from (1) that
(1− pa,b)n ≤ (1− pb,b)eε + δ .
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As pb,b ≥ 1 − e−ε/2 we get that pa,b ≥ 1 − (1/2 + δ)1/n holds. Finally, pa,b ≥ (1/2 − δ)/n
follows from the fact that(
1− 1
n
(
1
2
− δ
))n
= 1−
(
1
2
− δ
)
+
n− 1
2n
(
1
2
− δ
)2
− · · ·
≥ 1−
(
1
2
− δ
)
=
1
2
+ δ ,
which uses that the terms in the binomial expansion are alternating in sign and decreasing
in magnitude.
We can now choose k = dn1/3e and combine Lemmas 4.2, 4.4 and 4.5 to obtain our lower
bound.
Theorem 4.2. Let P be an (ε, δ)-DP n-party protocol for real summation on [0, 1] in the
one-message shuffle model with δ < 1/2. Then, MSE(P) = Ω(n1/3).
Proof. By the previous lemmas, taking ~X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) with independent Xi ∼ Unif(I) we
have
MSE(P , ~X) ≥ n
∑
b∈I
min
{
1− pb,b
4k3
,
1
48
(
1− 1
k2
)
min
a∈I
pa,b
}
≥ n
∑
b∈I
min
{
e−ε
8k3
,
1
48n
(
1− 1
k2
)(
1
2
− δ
)}
= nkmin
{
e−ε
8k3
,
1
48n
(
1− 1
k2
)(
1
2
− δ
)}
.
Therefore, taking k = dn1/3e yields MSE(P , ~X) = Ω(n1/3). Finally, the result follows from
observing that a lower bound for the expected MSE implies a lower bound for worst-case
MSE:
MSE(P) = sup
~x∈[0,1]n
MSE(P , ~x) ≥ sup
~x∈In
MSE(P , ~x) ≥ MSE(P , ~X) = Ω(n1/3) .
5 Privacy Amplification by Shuffling
In this section we prove a new privacy amplification result for shuffled mechanisms. In
particular, we will show that shuffling n copies of an ε0-LDP local randomizer with ε0 =
O(log(n/ log(1/δ))) yields an (ε, δ)-DP mechanism with ε = O((ε0 ∧ 1)eε0
√
log(1/δ)/n),
where a ∧ b = min{a, b}. For this same problem, the following privacy amplification bound
was obtained by Erlingsson et al. in [14], which we state here for the randomize-then-shuffle
setting (cf. Section 1.1.3).
Theorem 5.1 ([14]). If R is a ε0-LDP local randomizer with ε0 < 1/2, then the shuffled
protocol S ◦ Rn is (ε, δ)-DP with
ε = 12ε0
√
log(1/δ)
n
for any n ≥ 1000 and δ < 1/100.
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Note that our result recovers the same dependencies on ε0, δ and n in the regime ε0 =
O(1). However, our bound also shows that privacy amplification can be extended to a
wider range of parameters. In particular, this allows us to show that in order to design a
shuffled (ε, δ)-DP mechanism with ε = Θ(1) it suffices to take any ε0-LDP local randomizer
with ε0 = O(log(ε
2n/ log(1/δ))). For shuffled binary randomized response, a dependence of
the type ε0 = O(log(ε
2n/ log(1/δ))) between the local and central privacy parameters was
obtained in [11] using an ad-hoc privacy analysis. Our results show that this amplification
phenomenon is not intrinsic to binary randomized response, and in fact holds for any pure
LDP local randomizer. Thus, our bound captures the privacy amplification regimes from
both [14] and [11], thus providing a unified analysis of privacy amplification by shuffling.
To prove our bound, we first generalize the key idea behind the analysis of shuffled
randomized response given in Section 3. This idea was to ignore any users who respond
truthfully, and then show that the responses of users who respond randomly provide privacy
for the response submitted by a target individual. To generalize this approach beyond
randomized response we introduce the notions of total variation similarity γR and blanket
distribution ωR of a local randomizer R. The similarity γR measures the probability that
the local randomizer will produce an output that is independent of the input data. When
this happens, the mechanism submits a sample from the blanket probability distribution ωR.
In the case of Algorithm 1 in Section 3, the parameter γRPH is the probability γ of ignoring
the input and submitting a sample from ωRPH = Unif([k]), the uniform distribution on [k].
We define these objects formally in Section 5.1, then give further examples and also study
the relation between γR and the privacy guarantees of R.
The second step of the proof is to extend the argument that allows us to ignore the
users who submit truthful responses in the privacy analysis of randomized response. In
the general case, with probability 1 − γR the local randomizer’s outcome depends on the
data but is not necessarily deterministic. Analyzing this step in full generality – where the
randomizer is arbitrary and the domain might be uncountable – is technically challenging.
We address this challenge by leveraging a characterization of differential privacy in terms
of hockey-stick divergences that originated in the formal methods community to address
the verification for differentially private programs [5, 4, 3] and has also been used to prove
tight results on privacy amplification by subsampling [1]. As a result of this step we obtain
a privacy amplification bound in terms of the expectation of a function of a sum of i.i.d.
random variables. Our final bound is obtained by using a concentration inequality to bound
this expectation.
The bound we obtain with this method provides a relation of the form F (ε, ε0, γ, n) ≤ δ,
where F is a complicated non-linear function. By simplifying this function F further we
obtain the asymptotic amplification bounds sketched above, where a bound for γ in terms of
ε0 is used. One can also obtain better mechanism-dependent bounds by computing the exact
γ for a given mechanism. In addition, fixing all but one of the parameters of the problem
we can numerically solve the inequality F (ε, ε0, γ, n) ≤ δ to obtain exact relations between
the parameters without having to provide appropriate constants for the asymptotic bounds
in closed-form. We experimentally showcase the advantages of this approach to privacy
calibration in Section 6.
Proofs for every result stated in this section are provided in Appendix A.
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5.1 Blanket Decomposition
The goal of this section is to provide a canonical way of decomposing any local randomizer
R : X → Y as a mixture between an input-dependent and an input-independent mecha-
nism. More specifically, let µx denote the output distribution of R(x). Given a collection of
distributions {µx}x∈X we will show how to find a probability γ, a distribution ω and a col-
lection of distribution {νx}x∈X such that for every x ∈ X we have the mixture decomposition
µx = (1−γ)νx+γω. Since the component ω does not depend on x, this decomposition shows
that R(x) is input oblivious with probability γ. Furthermore, our construction provides the
largest possible γ for which this decomposition can be attained.
To motivate the construction sketched above it will be useful to recall a well-known
property of the total variation distance. Given probability distributions µ, µ′ over Y, this
distance is defined as
T(µ‖µ′) = sup
E⊆Y
(µ(E)− µ′(E)) = 1
2
∫
|µ(y)− µ′(y)|dy .
Note how here we use the notation µ(y) to denote the “probability” of an individual outcome,
which formally is only valid when the space Y is discrete so that every singleton is an atom.
Thus, in the case where Y is a continuous space we take µ(y) to denote the density of µ at
y, where the density is computed with respect to some base measure on Y. We note that
this abuse of notation is introduced for convenience and does not restrict the generality of
our results.
The total variation distance admits a number of alternative characterizations. The fol-
lowing one is particularly useful:
T(µ‖µ′) = 1−
∫
min{µ(y), µ′(y)}dy . (2)
This shows that T(µ‖µ′) can be computed in terms of the total probability mass that is
simultaneously under µ and µ′. Equation 2 can be derived from the interpretation of the
total variation distance in terms of couplings [23]. Using this characterization it is easy to
construct mixture decompositions of the form µ = (1− γ)ν+ γω, µ′ = (1− γ)ν ′+ γω, where
γ = 1 − T(µ‖µ′) and ω(y) = min{µ(y), µ′(y)}/γ. These decompositions are optimal in the
sense that γ is maximal and ν and ν ′ have disjoint support.
Extending the ideas above to the case with more than two distributions will provide the
desired decomposition for any local randomizer. In particular, we define the total variation
similarity of a set of distributions Λ = {µx}x∈X over Y as
γΛ =
∫
inf
x
µx(y)dy .
We also define the blanket distribution of Λ as the distribution given by ωΛ(y) = infx µx(y)/γΛ.
In this way, given a set of distributions Λ = {µx}x∈X with total variation similarity γ and
blanket distribution ω, we obtain a mixture decomposition µx = (1 − γ)νx + γω for each
distribution in Λ, where it is immediate to check that νx = (µx − γω)/(1 − γ) is indeed a
probability distribution. It follows from this construction that γ is maximal since one can
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show that, by the definition of ω, for each y there exists an x such that νx(y) = 0. Thus, it
is not possible to increase γ while ensuring that νx are probability distributions.
Accordingly, we can identify a local randomizerR with the set of distributions {R(x)}x∈X
and define the total variation similarity γR and the blanket distributions ωR of the mecha-
nism. As usual, we shall just write γ and ω when the randomizer is clear from the context.
Figure 2 plots the blanket distribution and the data-dependent distributions corresponding
to the local randomizer obtained by the Laplace mechanism with inputs on [0, 1].
The next result provides expressions for the total variation similarity of three important
randomizers: k-ary randomized response, the Laplace mechanism on [0, 1] and the Gaussian
mechanism on [0, 1]. Note that two of these randomizers offer pure LDP while the third
one only offers approximate LDP, showing that the notion of total variation similarity and
blanket distribution are widely applicable.
Lemma 5.1. The following hold:
1. γ = k/(eε0 + k − 1) for ε0-LDP randomized response on [k],
2. γ = e−ε0/2 for ε0-LDP Laplace on [0, 1],
3. γ = 2P[N(0, σ2) ≤ −1/2] for a Gaussian mechanism with variance σ2 on [0, 1].
This lemma illustrates how the privacy parameters of a local randomizer and its total
variation similarity are related in concrete instances. As expected, the probability of sam-
pling from the input-independent blanket grows as the mechanisms become more private.
For arbitrary ε0-LDP local randomizers we are able to show that the probability γ of ignoring
the input is at least e−ε0 .
Lemma 5.2. The total variation similarity of any ε0-LDP local randomizer satisfies γ ≥
e−ε0.
5.2 Privacy Amplification Bounds
Now we proceed to prove the amplification bound stated at the beginning of Section 5. The
key ingredient in this proof is to reduce the analysis of the privacy of a shuffled mechanism to
the problem of bounding a function of i.i.d. random variables. This reduction is obtained by
leveraging the characterization of differential privacy in terms of hockey-stick divergences.
Let µ, µ′ be distributions over Y. The hockey-stick divergence of order eε between µ and
µ′ is defined as
Deε(µ‖µ′) =
∫
[µ(y)− eεµ′(y)]+dy ,
where [u]+ = max{0, u}. Using these divergences one obtains the following useful character-
ization of differential privacy.
Theorem 5.2 ([5]). A mechanismM : Xn → Y is (ε, δ)-DP if and only if Deε(M(~x)‖M(~x′)) ≤
δ for any ~x ' ~x′.
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This result is straightforward once one observes the identity∫
[µ(y)− eεµ′(y)]+dy = sup
E⊆Y
(µ(E)− eεµ′(E)) .
An important advantage of the integral formulation is that enables one to reason over
individual outputs as opposed to sets of outputs for the case of (ε, δ)-DP. This is also the
case for the usual sufficient condition for (ε, δ)-DP in terms of a high probability bound for
the privacy loss random variable. However, this sufficient condition is not tight for small
values of ε [2], so here we prefer to work with the divergence-based characterization.
The first step in our proof of privacy amplification by shuffling is to provide a bound
for the divergence Deε(M(~x)‖M(~x′)) for a shuffled mechanism M = S ◦ Rn in terms of a
random variable that depends on the blanket of the local randomizer. Let R : X→ Y be a
local randomizer with blanket ω. Suppose W ∼ ω is a Y-valued random variable sampled
from the blanket. For any ε ≥ 0 and x, x′ ∈ X we define the privacy amplification random
variable as
Lx,x
′
ε =
µx(W)− eεµx′(W)
ω(W)
,
where µx (resp. µx′) is the output distribution of R(x) (resp. R(x′)). This definition allows
us to obtain the following result.
Lemma 5.3. Let R : X→ Y be a local randomizer and let M = S ◦ Rn be the shuffling of
R. Fix ε ≥ 0 and inputs ~x ' ~x′ with xn 6= x′n. Suppose L1, L2, . . . are i.i.d. copies of Lx,x′ε
and γ is the total variation similarity of R. Then we have the following:
Deε(M(~x)‖M(~x′)) ≤ 1
γn
n∑
m=1
(
n
m
)
γm(1− γ)n−mE
[
m∑
i=1
Li
]
+
. (3)
The bound above can also be given a more probabilistic formulation as follows. Let
M ∼ Bin(n, γ) be the random variable counting the number of users who sample from the
blanket of R. Then we can re-write (3) as
Deε(M(~x)‖M(~x′)) ≤ 1
γn
E
[
M∑
i=1
Li
]
+
,
where we use the convention
∑m
i=1 Li = 0 when m = 0.
Leveraging this bound to analyze the privacy of a shuffled mechanism requires some in-
formation about the privacy amplification random variables of an arbitrary local randomizer.
The main observation here is that Lx,x
′
ε has negative expectation. This means we can ex-
pect E[
∑m
i=1 Li]+ to decrease with m since adding more variables will shift the expectation
of
∑m
i=1 Li towards −∞, thus making it less likely to be above 0. Since m represents the
number of users who sample from the blanket, this reinforces the intuition that having more
users sample from the blanket makes it easier for the data of the nth user to be hidden
among these samples. The following lemma will help us make this precise by providing the
expectation of Lx,x
′
ε as well as its range and second moment.
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Lemma 5.4. Let R : X→ Y be an ε0-LDP local randomizer with total variation similarity
γ. For any ε ≥ 0 and x, x′ ∈ X the privacy amplification random variable L = Lx,x′ε satisfies:
1. EL = 1− eε,
2. γe−ε0(1− eε+2ε0) ≤ L ≤ γeε0(1− eε−2ε0),
3. EL2 ≤ γeε0(e2ε + 1)− 2γ2eε−2ε0.
Now we can use the information about the privacy amplification random variables of
an ε0-LDP local randomizer provided by the previous lemma to give upper bounds for
E[
∑m
i=1 Li]+. This can be achieved by using concentration inequalities to bound the tails
of
∑m
i=1 Li. Based on the information provided by Lemma 5.4 there are multiple ways to
achieve this. In this section we unfold a simple strategy based on Hoeffding’s inequality that
only uses points (1) and (2) above. In Section 5.3 we discuss how to improve these bounds.
For now, the following result will suffice to obtain a privacy amplification bound for generic
ε0-LDP local randomizers.
Lemma 5.5. Let L1, . . . , Lm be i.i.d. bounded random variables with ELi = −a ≤ 0. Suppose
b− ≤ Li ≤ b+ and let b = b+ − b−. Then the following holds:
E
[
m∑
i=1
Li
]
+
≤ b
2
4a
e−
2ma2
b2 .
By combining Lemmas 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 we immediately obtain the main theorem of this
section.
Theorem 5.3. Let R : X → Y be an ε0-LDP local randomizer and let M = S ◦ Rn be the
corresponding shuffled mechanism. Then M is (ε, δ)-DP for any ε and δ satisfying
(eε + 1)2(eε0 − e−ε0)2
4n(eε − 1) e
−Cn
(
1
eε0
∧ (eε−1)2
(eε+1)2(eε0−e−ε0 )2
)
≤ δ , (4)
where C = 1− e−2 ≈ 0.86.
While it is easy to numerically test or solve (4), extracting manageable asymptotics from
this bound is less straightforward. The following corollary massages this expression to distill
insights about privacy amplification by shuffling for generic ε0-LDP local randomizers.
Corollary 5.3.1. Let R : X → Y be an ε0-LDP local randomizer and let M = S ◦ Rn be
the corresponding shuffled mechanism. If ε0 ≤ log(n/ log(1/δ))/2, then M is (ε, δ)-DP with
ε = O((1 ∧ ε0)eε0
√
log(1/δ)/n).
5.3 Improved Amplification Bounds
There are at least two ways in which we can improve upon the privacy amplification bound
in Theorem 5.3. One is to leverage the moment information about the privacy amplification
random variables provided by point (3) in Lemma 5.4. The other is to compute more precise
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information about the privacy amplification random variables for specific mechanisms instead
of using the generic bounds provided by Lemma 5.4. In this section we give the necessary
tools to obtain these improvements, which we then evaluate numerically in Section 6.
Hoeffding’s inequality provides concentration for sums of bounded random variables. As
such, it is easy to apply because it requires little information on the behavior of the individual
random variables. On the other hand, this simplicity can sometimes provide sub-optimal
results, especially when the random variables being added have standard deviation which is
smaller than their range. In this case one can obtain better results by applying one of the
many concentration inequalities that take the variance of the summands into account. The
following lemma takes this approach by applying Bennett’s inequality to bound the quantity
E[
∑m
i=1 Li]+.
Lemma 5.6. Let L1, . . . , Lm be i.i.d. bounded random variables with ELi = −a ≤ 0. Suppose
Li ≤ b+ and EL2i ≤ c. Then the following holds:
E
[
m∑
i=1
Li
]
+
≤ b+
am log
(
1 + ab+
c
)e−mcb2+ φ(ab+c ) ,
where φ(u) = (1 + u) log(1 + u)− u.
This results can be combined with Lemmas 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 to obtain an alternative
privacy amplification bound for generic ε0-LDP local randomizers to the one provided in
Theorem 5.3. However, the resulting bound is cumbersome and does not have a nice closed-
form like the one in Theorem 5.3. Thus, instead of stating the bound explicitly we will
evaluate it numerically in the following section.
The other way in which we can provide better privacy bounds is by making them mech-
anism specific. Lemma 5.1 already gives exact expression for the total variation similarity
γ of three local randomizers. To be able to apply Hoeffding’s (Lemma 5.5) and Bennett’s
(Lemma 5.6) inequalities to these local randomizers we need information about the range
and the second moment of the corresponding privacy amplification random variables. The
following results provide this type of information for randomized response and the Laplace
mechanism.
Lemma 5.7. Let R : [k] → [k] be the k-ary ε0-LDP randomized response mechanism. Let
γ = k/(eε0 + k − 1) be the total variation similarity of R (cf. Lemma 5.1). For any ε ≥ 0
and x, x′ ∈ X, x 6= x′, the privacy amplification random variable L = Lx,x′ε satisfies:
1. −(1− γ)keε ≤ L− γ(1− eε) ≤ (1− γ)k,
2. EL2 = γ(2− γ)(1− eε)2 + (1− γ)2k(1 + e2ε).
Lemma 5.8. Let R : [0, 1] → R be the ε0-LDP Laplace mechanism R(x) = x + Lap(1/ε0).
For any ε ≥ 0 and x, x′ ∈ X the privacy amplification random variable L = Lx,x′ε satisfies:
1. e−ε0/2(1− eε+ε0) ≤ L ≤ eε0/2(1− eε−ε0),
2. EL2 ≤ e2ε+1
3
(2eε0/2 + e−ε0)− 2eε(2e−ε0/2 − e−ε0).
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Again, instead of deriving a closed-form expression like (4) specialized to these two mech-
anisms, we will numerically evaluate the advantage of using mechanism-specific information
in the bounds in the next section. Note that we did not provide a version of these results
for the Gaussian mechanism for which we showed how to compute γ in Section 5.1. The
reason for this is that in this case the resulting privacy amplification random variables are
not bounded. This precludes us from using the Hoeffding and Bennett bounds to analyze
the privacy amplification in this case. Approaches using concentration bounds that do not
rely on boundedness will be explored in future work.
6 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we provide a numerical evaluation of the privacy amplification bounds derived
in Section 5. We also compare the results obtained with our techniques to the privacy
amplification bound of Erlingsson et al. [14].
To obtain values of ε and ε0 from bounds on δ of the form given in Theorem 5.3 we
use a numeric procedure. In particular, we implemented the bounds for δ in Python and
then used SciPy’s numeric root finding routines to solve for the desired parameter up to a
precision of 10−12. This leads to a simple and efficient implementation which can be employed
in practical applications for the calibration of privacy parameters of local randomizers in
shuffled protocols. The resulting code is available at https://github.com/BorjaBalle/
amplification-by-shuffling.
The results of our evaluation are given in Figure 3. The bounds plotted in this figure are
obtained as follows:
1. (EFMRTT’19) is the bound in [14] (see Theorem 5.1).
2. (Hoeffding, Generic) is the bound from Theorem 5.3.
3. (Bennett, Generic) is obtained by combining Lemmas 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.6.
4. (Hoeffding, RR) is obtained by combining Lemmas 5.1, 5.3, 5.7 and 5.5.
5. (Bennett, RR) is obtained by combining Lemmas 5.1, 5.3, 5.7 and 5.6.
6. (Hoeffding, Laplace) is obtained by combining Lemmas 5.1, 5.3, 5.8 and 5.5.
7. (Bennett, Laplace) is obtained by combining Lemmas 5.1, 5.3, 5.8 and 5.6.
In panel (i) we observe that our two bounds for generic randomizers give significantly
smaller values of ε than the bound from [14] where the constants where not optimized. Ad-
ditionally, we see that for generic local randomizers, Hoeffding is better for small values of n,
while Bennet is better for large values of n. In panel (ii) we observe the advantage of incorpo-
rating information in the Hoeffding bound about the specific local randomizer. Additionally,
this plot allows us to see that for the same level of local DP, binary randomized response
has better amplification properties than Laplace, which in turn is better the randomizer
response over a domain of size k = 100. In panel (iii) we compare the amplification bounds
obtained for specific randomizers with the Hoeffding and Bennett bounds. We observe that
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for every mechanism the Bennett bound is better than the Hoeffding bound, especially for
large values of n. Additionally, the gain of using Bennett instead of Hoeffding is greater for
randomized response with k = 100 than for other mechanisms. The reason for this is that
for fixed ε0 and large k, the total variation similarity of randomized response is close to 1 (cf.
Lemma 5.1). Finally, in panel (iv) we compare the values of ε0 obtained for a randomized
response with domain size growing with the number of users as k = n1/3. This is in line
with our optimal protocol for real summation in the single-message shuffle model presented
in Section 4. We observe that also in this case the Bennett bounds provides a significant
advantage over Hoeffding.
To summarize, we showed that our generic bounds outperform the previous amplifica-
tion bounds developed in [14]. Additionally, we showed that incorporating both information
about the variance of the privacy amplification random variable via the use of Bennett’s
bound, as well as information about the behavior of this random variable for specific mech-
anisms, leads to significant improvements in the privacy parameters obtained for shuffled
protocols. This is important in practice because being able to maximize the ε0 parameter
for the local randomizer – while satisfying a prescribed level of differential privacy in the
shuffled protocol – leads to more accurate protocols.
7 Conclusion
We have shown a separation result for the single-message shuffle model, showing that it can
not achieve the level of accuracy of the curator model of differential privacy, but that it
can yield protocols that are significantly more accurate than the ones from the local model.
More specifically, we provided a single message protocol for private n-party summation of
real values in [0, 1] with O(log n)-bit communication and O(n1/6) standard deviation. We
also showed that our protocol is optimal in terms of accuracy by providing a lower bound
for this problem. In previous work, Cheu et al. [11] had shown that the selection problem
can be solved more accurately in the central model than in the shuffle model, and that the
real summation problem can be solved more accurately in the shuffle model than in the local
model. For the former, they rely on lower bounds for selection in the local model by means
of a generic reduction from the shuffle to the local model, while our lower bound is directly in
the shuffle model, offering additional insight. On the other hand, our single-message protocol
for summation is more accurate than theirs.
Moreover, we introduced the notion of the privacy blanket of a local randomizer, and
show how it allows us to give a generic treatment to the problem of obtaining privacy
amplification bounds in the shuffle model that improves on recent work by Erlingsson et
al. [14] and Cheu et al. [11]. Crucially, unlike the proofs in [14, 11], our proof does not rely
on privacy amplification by subsampling. We believe that the notion of the privacy blanket
is of interest beyond the shuffle model, as it leads to a canonical decomposition of local
randomizers that might be useful also in the study of the local model of differential privacy.
For example, Joseph et al. [19] already used a generalization of our blanket decomposition
in their study of the role of interactivity in local DP protocols.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proofs from Section 5.1
Proof of Lemma 5.1. To obtain (1) recall that an ε0-LDP randomized response mechanism
R over [k] satisfies
P[R(x) = x] = e
ε0
eε0 + k − 1 ,
P[R(x) = x′] = 1
eε0 + k − 1 ,
for x′ 6= x. Therefore, we get
γR =
∑
y∈[k]
min
x∈[k]
P[R(x) = y] = k
eε0 + k − 1 .
To obtain (2) recall that an ε0-LDP Laplace mechanism R : [0, 1] → R has distribution
µx(y) =
ε0
2
e−ε0|y−x|. Thus, for any y ∈ R we have
inf
x∈[0,1]
µx(y) =
ε0
2
min{e−ε0|y|, e−ε0|y−1|} .
We can use to decompose the definition of γR into the sum of two integrals as follows:
γR =
∫ ∞
−∞
inf
x∈[0,1]
µx(y) =
ε0
2
(∫ 1
2
−∞
e−ε0|y−1| +
∫ ∞
1
2
e−ε0|y|
)
.
Performing the change of variables z = y − 1/2 in the first integral yields
ε0
2
∫ 1
2
−∞
e−ε0|y−1| =
ε0
2
∫ 0
−∞
e−ε0|z|−
ε0
2 =
e−ε0/2
2
.
Similarly, for the second integral we also have
ε0
2
∫ ∞
1
2
e−ε0|y| =
e−ε0/2
2
.
Thus, γR = e−ε0/2. We note for future reference that this argument also shows that the
blanket distribution of a Laplace mechanism is again a Laplace distribution. In particular,
we have ωR(y) = ε02 e
−ε0|y−1/2|.
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To obtain (3) recall that a Gaussian local randomizer R : [0, 1] → R with variance σ2
has distribution µx(y) = e
−(y−x)2/2σ2/
√
2piσ2. Therefore, for any y ∈ R we have
inf
x∈[0,1]
µx(y) =
1√
2piσ2
min{e−y2/2σ2 , e−(y−1)2/2σ2} .
Integrating this expression over y ∈ R we get
γR = P[N(1, σ2) ≤ 1/2] + P[N(0, σ2) ≥ 1/2] = 2P[N(0, σ2) ≥ −1/2] ,
where we used the symmetry of the Gaussian distribution around its mean.
Proof of Lemma 5.2. Fix an arbitrary x0 ∈ X. Expanding the definition of total variation
similarity and using the R is ε0-LDP we get
γ =
∫
inf
x
µx(y) =
∫
infx µx(y)
µx0(y)
µx0(y) ≥ e−ε0 .
A.2 Proof of Lemma 5.3
The proof of Lemma 5.3 requires a number of intermediate steps we formalize as lemmas.
Before stating and proving these lemmas we need to introduce some notation.
Let R : X → Y be a local randomizer with total variation similarity γ and blanket
distribution ω. For x ∈ X we write µx for the distribution of R(x) and recall that we have
the mixture decompositions µx = (1− γ)νx + γω.
Let M = S ◦ Rn be the shuffling of R. Fixing an input ~x ∈ Xn we define the random
variables Yi ∼ µxi for i ∈ [n]. Now we can consider the output ofM(~x) as a realization of the
random multiset Y = {Y1, . . . ,Yn} ∈ NYn , where NYn denotes the collection of all multisets of
cardinality n with elements in X. Similarly, for ~x′ ∈ Xn with ~x ' ~x′, xn 6= x′n, we define the
output ofM(~x′) as a realization of the random multiset Y′ = {Y1, . . . ,Yn−1,Y′n}. Thus, our
goal is to bound Deε(Y‖Y′), where we slightly abuse our divergence notation by applying it
to random variables instead of distributions.
In order to exploit the mixture decomposition provided by the blanket of R we define
additional random variables. Let Vi ∼ νxi for i ∈ [n − 1] and let W1, . . . ,Wn−1 be i.i.d.
random variables with Wi ∼ ω. Thus, for i ∈ [n− 1] we have
Yi =
{
Vi with probability γ ,
Wi with probability 1− γ .
Finally, we define B ⊆ [n − 1] to be the random subset of users among the first n − 1
who sample from the blanket, and let B¯ = [n − 1] \ B. Note that for any B ⊆ [n − 1] we
have P[B = B] = γ|B|(1 − γ)n−1−|B|. Conditioned on a particular value for the set of users
who sample from the blanket we have
Y|{B = B} = WB ∪ VB¯ ∪ {Yn} ,
29
where WB = {Wi | i ∈ B} and VB¯ = {Vi | i ∈ [n− 1] \B}.
With the notation defined above we can now state the following result, which shows that
to bound Deε(Y‖Y′) it is enough to bound the divergences between the conditional random
variables Y|{B = B} and Y′|{B = B} for all possible choices of the set B ⊆ [n− 1] of users
who sample from the blanket.
Lemma A.1. Fix ε ≥ 0. Given B ⊆ [n− 1] let
DB = Deε(WB ∪ VB¯ ∪ {Yn}‖WB ∪ VB¯ ∪ {Y′n}) .
Then the following holds:
Deε(Y‖Y′) ≤
∑
B⊆[n−1]
γ|B|(1− γ)n−1−|B|DB . (5)
Proof. Recall that the hockey-stick divergence Deε is an f -divergence in the sense of Csisza´r;
this can be seen by taking f(u) = [u− eε]+. The result follows from a standard application
of the joint convexity property of f -divergences.
The next step in the proof is to ignore the contribution of any user among the first n− 1
who do not sample from the blanket. In mathematical terms, and using the notation from
Lemma A.1, this is stated as
DB ≤ Deε(WB ∪ {Yn}‖WB ∪ {Y′n}) . (6)
To obtain such inequality we use the following lemma.
Lemma A.2. Let A0,A,A
′ be random multisets of fixed cardinality with |A| = |A′|. Then
the following holds:
Deε(A0 ∪ A‖A0 ∪ A′) ≤ Deε(A‖A′) .
Proof. We shall prove the result for |A0| = 1. The general result follows directly by induction
on the size of A0.
Suppose |A0| + |A| = m and A0 = {A} for some random variable A. For any multiset
Y ∈ NYm we can write
P[A0 ∪ A = Y ] =
∑
y∈Y
P[A = y]P[A = Y \ {y}] ,
where we take the convention that P[A = Y \ {y}] = 0 whenever y /∈ Y . Now we expand the
definition of Deε to get:
Deε(A0 ∪ A‖A0 ∪ A′) =
∫
NYm
[P[A0 ∪ A = Y ]− eεP[A0 ∪ A′ = Y ]]+
≤
∫
NYm
∑
y∈Y
P[A = y] [P[A = Y \ {y}]− eεP[A′ = Y \ {y}]]+
=
∫
NYm−1
[P[A = Y ]− eεP[A′ = Y ]]+ = Deε(A‖A′) .
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Taking A0 = VB¯ in Lemma A.2 yields (6). Now we observe that since the random
variables Wi, i ∈ [n−1], are i.i.d., the distribution of the random multiset WB only depends
on B through its cardinality m = |B|. Accordingly, we define Wm = {W1, . . . ,Wm} for
m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}, where W0 = ∅. This allows us to summarize the argument so far as
showing that Deε(Y‖Y′) can be upper bounded by
n−1∑
m=0
(
n− 1
m
)
γm(1− γ)n−1−mDeε(Wm ∪ {Yn}‖Wm ∪ {Y′n}) .
The next step in the proof is to obtain an expression for the divergences in this expression
in terms of the privacy amplification random variables. This is done in the following lemma.
Lemma A.3. For any m ≥ 1 we have
Deε(Wm−1 ∪ {Yn}‖Wm−1 ∪ {Y′n}) = E
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
Li
]
+
.
Proof. Let ~y ∈ Ym be a tuple of elements from Y and Y ∈ NYm be the corresponding multiset
of entries. Then we have
P[Wm−1 ∪ {Yn} = Y ] = 1
m!
∑
σ
P[(W1, . . . ,Wm−1,Yn) = ~yσ] ,
where σ ranges over all permutations of [m] and we write ~yσ = (yσ(1), . . . , yσ(m)). Now note
that since Wi ∼ ω and Yn ∼ µxn , we also have
P[(W1, . . . ,Wm−1,Yn) = ~yσ] = ω(yσ(1)) · · ·ω(yσ(m−1))µxn(yσ(m)) .
Summing this expression over all permutations σ and factoring out the product of the ω’s
yields:
1
m!
∑
σ
ω(yσ(1)) · · ·ω(yσ(m−1))µxn(yσ(m))
=
(
m∏
i=1
ω(yi)
)
1
m
m∑
i=1
µxn(yi)
ω(yi)
= P[Wm = Y ]
1
m
m∑
i=1
µxn(yi)
ω(yi)
.
Now we can plug these observation into the definition of Deε and complete the proof as
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follows:
Deε(Wm−1 ∪ {Yn}‖Wm−1 ∪ {Y′n})
=
∫
NYm
[P[Wm−1 ∪ {Yn} = Y ]− eεP[Wm−1 ∪ {Y′n} = Y ]]+
=
∫
NYm
P[Wm = Y ]
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
µxn(yi)− eεµx′n(yi)
ω(yi)
]
+
= E
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
µxn(Wi)− eεµx′n(Wi)
ω(Wi)
]
+
= E
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
Li
]
+
.
To conclude the proof of Lemma 5.3 we perform a change of variable to obtain
Deε(Y‖Y′) ≤
n−1∑
m=0
(
n− 1
m
)
γm(1− γ)n−1−mE
[
1
m+ 1
m+1∑
i=1
Li
]
+
=
1
γn
n∑
m=1
(
n
m
)
γm(1− γ)n−mE
[
m∑
i=1
Li
]
+
.
We note that despite the length of the proof, only two inequalities were used to obtain the
result. The one in Lemma A.1 which follows from joint convexity, and the one in Lemma A.2
which is a post-processing type property.
A.3 Other Proofs from Section 5.2
Proof of Lemma 5.4. Let W ∼ ω. Then, for any x ∈ X we have
E
[
µx(W )
ω(W )
]
=
∫
µx(y)
ω(y)
ω(y)dy =
∫
µx(y)dy = 1 .
Thus, the first claim follows by linearity of expectation:
EL = E
[
µx(W)− eεµx′(W)
ω(W)
]
= 1− eε .
For the second claim we expand the definition of ω to write
µx(y)− eεµx′(y)
ω(y)
= γ
µx(y)− eεµx′(y)
infx0 µx0(y)
and then use that R is ε0-LDP to get
e−ε0 − eε+ε0 ≤ µx(y)− e
εµx′(y)
infx0 µx0(y)
≤ eε0 − eε−ε0 .
32
for any y ∈ Y.
To prove the third claim we note that since R is ε0-LDP we have
E
[(
µx(W )
ω(W )
)2]
=
∫ (
µx(y)
ω(y)
)2
ω(y)dy =
∫
µx(y)
ω(y)
µx(y)dy ≤ γeε0 .
Furthermore, we can use a similar argument to show that
E
[
µx(W )µx′(W )
ω(W )2
]
=
∫
µx(y)µx′(y)
ω(y)2
ω(y)dy ≥ γ2e−2ε0 .
Plugging the last two bounds together we obtain
EL2 = E
[(
µx(W )− eεµx′(W )
ω(W )
)2]
≤ γeε0(e2ε + 1)− 2γ2eε−2ε0 .
Lemma A.4. Suppose h : [a,∞)→ R is a differentiable function such that limt→∞ h(t) =∞
and h′(t) is monotonically increasing. Then the following holds:∫ ∞
a
e−h(t) ≤ e
−h(a)
h′(a)
.
Proof. Note d
dt
e−h(t) = −h′(t)e−h(t). Thus, we can write∫ ∞
a
e−h(t) =
∫ ∞
a
d
dt
e−h(t)
−h′(t) ≤
−1
h′(a)
∫ ∞
a
d
dt
e−h(t) =
e−h(a)
h′(a)
.
Proof of Lemma 5.5. Recall that for any non-negative random variable L we have EL =∫∞
0
P[L > t]dt. Furthermore, taking L =
∑m
i=1 Li we have P[[L]+ > t] = P[L > t] for any
t ≥ 0. Under our assumptions on Li we can use Hoeffding’s inequality to show that
P[L > t] = P[L− EL > t+ am] ≤ e− 2(t+am)
2
mb2 .
Finally, applying Lemma A.4 with h(t) = 2(t+am)
2
mb2
we obtain
E[L]+ ≤
∫ ∞
0
e−
2(t+am)2
mb2 ≤ b
2
4a
e−
2ma2
b2 .
Proof of Theorem 5.3. Suppose R has total variation similarity γ. By Lemma 5.4 we can
apply Lemma 5.5 to bound the expectations E[
∑m
i=1 Li] in Lemma 5.3 with a = e
ε − 1 and
b = γ(eε + 1)(eε0 − e−ε0). Thus, using the binomial identity
n∑
m=0
(
n
m
)
γm(1− γ)n−me−sm = (1− γ(1− e−s))n
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we get
n∑
m=1
(
n
m
)
γm(1− γ)n−mE
[
m∑
i=1
Li
]
+
≤ b
2
4a
(
1− γ
(
1− e− 2a
2
b2
))n
≤ b
2
4a
e
−γn
(
1−e−
2a2
b2
)
.
Now we use 1− e−2x ≥ C(1 ∧ x) to see that
1
γn
b2
4a
e
−γn
(
1−e−
2a2
b2
)
≤ 1
γn
b2
4a
e
−Cγn
(
1∧a2
b2
)
=
γ(eε + 1)2(eε0 − e−ε0)2
4n(eε − 1) e
−Cn
(
γ∧ (eε−1)2
γ(eε+1)2(eε0−e−ε0 )2
)
The bound follows from substituting the inequalities e−ε0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 (Lemma 5.2) above.
Proof of Corollary 5.3.1. To obtain the desired result we first massage the LHS of (4) and
then solve for ε in the resulting inequality. We start by observing that eε0 − e−ε0 = O((1 ∧
ε0)e
ε0). Furthermore, since the assumption ε0 ≤ log(n/ log(1/δ))/2 implies ε = O(1), we
have (eε − 1)/(eε + 1) = Ω(ε). Plugging these bounds in the exponential term on the LHS
of (4) we see that
e
−Cn
(
1
eε0
∧ (eε−1)2
(eε+1)2(eε0−e−ε0 )2
)
= e
−Ω
(
n
eε0
(
1∧ ε2
(1∧ε20)e
ε0
))
= e
−Ω
(
nε2
(1∧ε20)e
2ε0
)
, (7)
where the last step uses that ε ≤ ε0 implies ε2 ≤ (1 ∧ ε20)eε0 . A similar argument based on
the same bounds also yields
(eε + 1)2(eε0 − e−ε0)2
4n(eε − 1) = O
(
(1 ∧ ε20)e2ε0
nε
)
. (8)
Combining (7) and (8) we obtain that M is (ε, δ)-DP as long as
O
(
(1 ∧ ε20)e2ε0
nε
)
· e−Ω
(
nε2
(1∧ε20)e
2ε0
)
≤ δ .
Taking ε = c(1 ∧ ε0)eε0
√
log(1/δ)/n for some constant c > 0, this translates to
O
(
(1 ∧ ε0)eε0
c
√
n log(1/δ)
)
· e−Ω(c2 log(1/δ)) ≤ δ .
The result now follows from the assumption ε0 ≤ log(n/ log(1/δ))/2 after making an appro-
priate choice for c.
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A.4 Proofs from Section 5.3
Proof of Lemma 5.6. Let L =
∑m
i=1 Li. Under our assumptions on Li we can apply Bennett’s
inequality [9, Theorem 2.9] to show that
P[L > t] = P[L− EL > t+ am] ≤ e−
mc
b2+
φ
(
(t+am)b+
mc
)
.
Following the same argument used to prove Lemma 5.5 we get
E[L]+ ≤
∫ ∞
0
e
−mc
b2+
φ
(
(t+am)b+
mc
)
≤ b+
am log
(
1 + ab+
c
)e−mcb2+ φ(ab+c ) ,
where we used φ′(u) = log(1 + u).
Proof of Lemma 5.7. Note that for an ε0-LDP randomized response mechanismR : [k]→ [k]
we have a uniform blanket distribution ω(y) = 1/k and νx(y) = I[y = x]. Thus, we obtain
(1) by noting that for any x, x′, y ∈ [k] we have
µx(y)− eεµx′(y)
ω(y)
= γ(1− eε) + (1− γ)k(I[y = x]− eεI[y = x′])
∈ [γ(1− eε)− (1− γ)keε, γ(1− eε) + (1− γ)k] .
To obtain (2) we first expand the definition of L to see that
EL2 = E
[
(γ(1− eε) + (1− γ)k(I[W = x]− eεI[W = x′]))2
]
.
Since for x 6= x′ we have P[W = x] = P[W = x′] = 1/k and P[W = x,W = x′] = 0, we can
expand the square in the above expression to get
EL2 = γ2(1− eε)2 + (1− γ)2k(e2ε + 1) + 2γ(1− γ)(1− eε)2
= γ(2− γ)(1− eε)2 + (1− γ)2k(1 + e2ε) .
Proof of Lemma 5.8. Recall from the proof of Lemma 5.1 that the blanket distribution of an
ε0-LDP Laplace mechanism on [0, 1] is given by the Laplace distribution ω(y) =
ε0
2
e−ε0|y−1/2|.
Therefore, for any x ∈ [0, 1] and y ∈ R we have
e−ε0/2 ≤ µx(y)
ω(y)
≤ eε0/2 ,
which implies (1) since for any x, x′ ∈ [0, 1] and y ∈ R:
µx(y)− eεµx′(y)
ω(y)
∈ [e−ε0/2(1− eε+ε0), eε0/2(1− eε−ε0)] .
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To compute the second moment of L we proceed like in the proof of Lemma 5.1 and show
that
E
[(
µx(W )
ω(W )
)2]
=
∫
µx(y)
ω(y)
µx(y)dy
=
ε0
2
∫ ∞
−∞
e−2ε0|y−x|+ε|y−1/2|
≤ 1
3
(2eε0/2 + e−ε0) ,
which is attained for x = 0 and x = 1. Furthermore, we have
E
[
µx(W )µx′(W )
ω(W )2
]
=
∫
µx(y)µx′(y)
ω(y)2
ω(y)dy
=
ε0
2
∫ ∞
−∞
e−ε0|y−x|−ε0|y−x
′|+ε0|y−1/2|
≤ 2e−ε0/2 − e−ε0 ,
which is attained on x = 0 and x′ = 1. Putting these two bounds together we get
EL2 ≤ e
2ε + 1
3
(2eε0/2 + e−ε0)− 2eε(2e−ε0/2 − e−ε0) .
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Figure 2: Illustration of the blanket distribution ω and the data-dependent distributions νx
corresponding to a 1-LDP Laplace mechanism with inputs on [0, 1].
37
103 104 105 106
n
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Generic, 0 = 0.5, = 10 6
EFMRTT'19
Hoeffding
Bennett
102 103 104 105
n
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
0
= 0.1, = 10 6
EFMRTT'19
Hoeffding, Generic
Hoeffding, RR-2
Hoeffding, RR-100
Hoeffding, Laplace
102 103 104 105
n
0
1
2
3
4
5
0
= 0.1, = 10 6
Hoeffding, RR-2
Bennett, RR-2
Hoeffding, RR-100
Bennett, RR-100
Hoeffding, Laplace
Bennett, Laplace
102 103 104 105
n
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
0
RRk, = 0.1, = n 2, k = n1/3
Hoeffding
Bennett
Figure 3: (i) Comparison of ε(n) for fixed ε0 and δ of the bounds obtained for generic ε0-
DP local randomizers using the bound in [14] and our Hoeffding and Bennett bounds. (ii)
Comparison of ε0(n) for fixed ε and δ for generic and specific local randomizers using the
Hoeffding bounds. (iii) Comparison of ε0(n) for fixed ε and δ for specific local randomizers
using the Hoeffding and Bennett bound. (iv) Comparison of ε0(n) for fixed ε and δ = n
−2
for a randomized response mechanism with domain size k = n1/3 using the Hoeffding and
Bennett bounds.
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